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A Maritime Safety Zone is defined by the U.S. Coast Guard as a water area, shore area, or water 
and shore area combined to which, for safety or environmental purposes, access is limited to 
authorized persons, vehicles, or vessels. A Maritime Safety Zone is established to prevent 
interference with safe navigation and tug maneuvers, to exclude third party access in order to 
reduce ignition probability, to aid in emergency preparation, and to protect the public from being 
exposed to potential harm. USCG also defines a Maritime Security Zone for protection against 
intentional threats, and this is usually larger than the Safety Zone. The USCG requires that a 
Maritime Safety Zone be defined before a Letter of Recommendation is given. While the Canada 
Marine Act only suggests that a port authority may establish Traffic Control Zones, the USCG 
suggests using the Sandia study as guidance for determining Maritime Safety and Security Zones. 
Though there are guidance documents, no standard method is currently available for determining 
site specific Maritime Safety Zones applicable to accidental spills that could occur at the 
waterfront configuration of the terminal. A common methodology would enable Safety Zones to 
be more properly defined and create safer waterways. Two types of approaches have been 
proposed by DNV GL in this paper to determine the Safety Zones surrounding LNG terminals 
from accidental spills. A deterministic approach is based on a single maximum credible event 
among a set of representative scenarios that have been modeled. This approach may 
conservatively produce a very large hazard distance depending on the consequence of the 
maximum credible scenario. A probabilistic approach is a risk based approach which associates 
the consequence (the thermal radiation intensities and the flammable vapor dispersion distances) 
with the likelihood of having such a consequence. A probabilistic approach provides a more 




Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) has been used commercially since the 1940s, and since then it has 
played an important role in U.S. energy markets. International LNG shipping began in 1959 and 
according to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), as of July 2015 there are more 
than 110 LNG facilities operating in the U.S. for a variety of purposes [1]. Some facilities serve 
for exporting natural gas from the U.S. to other countries, some import the natural gas and 
supply to local distribution companies or the interstate pipeline system; however most are LNG 
peak-shaving facilities storing the natural gas for periods of peak demand.  
Natural gas can be cooled to a liquid state with a volume reduction of approximately 600 times, 
which makes it efficient for storage and shipping over long distances in large quantities. The 
large volumes bring concerns about serious potential hazards. The marine safety record of the 
LNG shipping industry is amongst the best in the world over the last 50 years.  Since 1959, a 
handful of groundings and collisions have been experienced by LNG carriers but none of these 
accidents has led to a major spill [2]. The most severe onshore LNG terminal accident happened 
at a peak shaving plant at Cleveland East Ohio in 1944. This gas explosion accident killed 128 
people and initiated public awareness and fears of the LNG hazards [3]. Since 1944, the 
worldwide safety record of onshore LNG terminals identifies 13 serious accidents (directly 
caused by LNG spill) [4]. Among these accidents, one killed 27 workers and injured 74 others in 
Skikda Algeria on January 19, 2004, and two caused single fatalities of onsite workers (i.e. one 
in Algeria in 1977 and another at Cove Point, Maryland in 1979) [4].  
LNG regulations are in place to safeguard the public and the environment, and for defining 
Safety Zones considering the land-side as well as the maritime-side of the LNG terminal. In the 
following sections of this paper, an overview of the USA and Canada regulations for siting LNG 
terminals is included with a summary of different requirements and guidance on determination of 
Safety Zones.  
Note that this paper primarily discusses the Maritime Safety Zones of the LNG terminals, 
associated with the waterfront operating configurations (i.e. jetty pipes, LNG loading arms/hoses, 
LNG carriers). The maritime-side is less prescriptive as to scenarios and approach than the land-
side. A deterministic approach and a probabilistic approach are proposed and compared aiming 
to enable Safety Zones to be more properly defined and create safer waterways. Finally, an 
example is given to demonstrate the advantage and disadvantage of the two approaches. 
2 USA and Canada regulations for siting LNG terminals 
FERC has the exclusive authority to approve or deny an application for the siting, construction, 
expansion, or operation of an import or export LNG terminal located onshore or in state waters. 
It is also responsible for the following actions [5]: issuing certificates of public convenience and 
necessity for LNG facilities engaged in interstate natural gas transportation by pipeline; 
preparing the National Environment Policy Act (NEPA) analyses for proposed LNG facilities 
under its jurisdiction. Depending on the location and the use, State utility regulatory agencies 
may also regulate an LNG facility. 
FERC relies on the regulations (Title 49, Part 193 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)) 
established by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) for guidance and determination of 
the siting requirements, which incorporates and references the NFPA 59A-2001 standard [6]. 49 
CFR 193 and NFPA 59A-2001, prescribe the methods and specific models to be used for 
estimating the land-based Safety Zones to ensure public safety. For a LNG project to be 
approved by FERC, it must meet the siting requirements of DOT’s regulations 49 CFR 193. 
The USCG (as a cooperating agency) reviews the Waterway Suitability Assessment (WSA) of 
the applicant before FERC approves the terminal operations. The USCG considers spills from 
the waterfront configurations (i.e. jetty pipes, loading arms/hoses and LNG vessels) and takes 
charge of the WSA to address navigation safety and port security issues associated with LNG 
vessel traffic. Safety Zones are required to be defined before a Letter of Recommendation can be 
issued by the USCG. In USCG’s WSA guidance (NVIC 01-2011), the Sandia studies are 
suggested to be used as guidance for determining the Maritime Safety Zones [7, 8, 9].  
As of September 2014, Canada has only one operating LNG terminal – Canaport LNG’s 
regasification facility located in Saint John, New Brunswick and no LNG export facilities. 
However, seventeen LNG export terminals are proposed and under the regulatory review process 
– sixteen in British Columbia (BC) and one in Nova Scotia (NS) [10].  
In Canada, most LNG terminal proposals require both federal and provincial permits via 
different types of assessment. An export license from the National Energy Board (NEB), 
Canada’s federal energy regulator, authorizes LNG export to overseas markets. A facility permit 
from the BC Oil and Gas Commission (BCOGC) must be obtained by LNG proponents before 
construction can start on a British Columbia liquefaction plant. BCOGC requires the applicants 
to ensure that the siting for the LNG facility conforms to CSA Z276 (Liquefied Natural Gas 
(LNG) - Production, Storage, and Handling) [11].  
Similar to the WSA process in the USA, Canada has implemented a Technical Review Process 
of Marine Terminal Systems and Transshipment Sites (TERMPOL).  The TERMPOL process is 
carried out under the leadership of Transport Canada. It focuses on the selected routes of vessels, 
their berthing at terminals and the process of cargo handling between vessels or off-loading from 
ship to shore [12]. This process assesses both the vessels suitability to navigate and the potential 
impacts in the waterway. Although this process is voluntary, it is often necessary to perform 
elements of the TERMPOL Review Process in order to engage effectively with local 
stakeholders. 
3 Guidance on Safety Zone Determination 
The main types of LNG hazards can be identified based on the physical characteristics of the 
LNG and the natural gas, which is summarized in the IMO report as detailed below [2]: 
• Pool Fires: LNG pool fires burn more rapidly and with greater emitted heat than oil or 
gasoline fires. Furthermore, they cannot easily be extinguished before all the LNG is 
consumed. Due to the high temperatures, it may pose significant thermal hazards to 
unprotected people and property for considerable distances.  
• Vapor clouds: If not immediately ignited, the evaporating natural gas may form a dense 
flammable cloud upon mixing with the air. If the cloud ignites within an enclosed or open but 
congested space, an explosion could occur. Otherwise, it will become a flash fire (which has 
a lesser hazard range) and burn its way back to the spill source and continue as a pool fire. 
49 CFR 193 (land-based Safety Zone) 
The code of federal regulation 49 CFR 193 governs siting, design, installation, or construction of 
LNG facilities and is more relevant to determine the land-side Safety Zones. According to 
Section 193.2051 of 49 CFR, each LNG facility designed, constructed, replaced, relocated or 
significantly altered must be provided with siting requirements in accordance with the 
requirements of NFPA 59A. Section 193.2057 and Section 193.2059 of 49 CFR 193 state that 
each LNG container and LNG transfer system must have a thermal Safety Zone in accordance 
with Section 2.2.3.2 of NFPA 59A-2001 and a dispersion Safety Zone in accordance with 
Section 2.2.3.3 and Section 2.2.3.4 of NFPA 59A-2001. A regulatory review for LNG siting 
requirements and methods in USA and Europe can also be found in Licari and Weimer [13], and 
Kohout [14]. 
NFPA 59A-2001 [6] 
As required by NFPA 59A-2001 Section 2.2.3.2, provisions shall be made to prevent thermal 
radiation flux from a fire from exceeding the following limits when atmospheric conditions are 0 
(zero) wind speed, 70°F (21°C) temperature, and 50 percent relative humidity. 
• 1,600 Btu/hr/ft2 (5,000 W/m2) at a property line that can be built upon for ignition of a 
design spill, 
• 1,600 Btu/hr/ft2 (5,000 W/m2) at the nearest point located outside the owner’s property 
line that, at the time of plant siting, is used for outdoor assembly by groups of 50 or more 
persons for a fire over an impounding area1, 
• 3,000 Btu/hr/ft2 (9,000 W/m2) at the nearest point of the building or structure outside the 
owner’s property line that is in existence at the time of plant siting and used for 
occupancies as assembly, educational, health care, detention and correction or residential 
for a fire over an impounding area, 
• 10,000 Btu/hr/ft2 (30,000 W/m2) at a property line that can be built upon for a fire over an 
impounding area. 
Per 49 CFR Section 193.2059 and NFPA 59A-2001 Section 2.2.3.3, the spacing of an LNG tank 
impoundment to the property line that can be built upon shall be such that, in the event of an 
LNG design spill, an average concentration of methane in air of 50 percent of the lower 
flammability limit (LFL) does not extend beyond the property line that can be built upon. While 
these Safety Zones seem quite clear, Havens and Spicer [15] have noted many inconsistencies in 
calculations contained in early public submissions. 
Although the proponent can select a design accidental event based on a 10-minute spill of the 
largest pump rate, which might imply great difference in hazard zones, in practice, the calculated 
hazard zones do not vary much due to the factor that they are dominated by boil-off from the 
impoundment. 
The thermal Safety Zone is essentially the 5,000 W/m2 thermal radiation zone generated from an 
impounding fire (LNG pool fire over an impounding area); the vapor cloud dispersion Safety 
Zone is defined by the ½ LFL concentration zone from a design spill over an impoundment. Note 
that when adopting the consequence based approach, ½ LFL provides a margin to account for 
uncertainties in the dispersion distance calculation.  
                                                 
1 Impounding Area-an area defined through the use of dikes, sumps or the site topography for the purpose of 
containing any accidental spill of LNG or flammable refrigerants [16]. 
NFPA 59A-2013 [16] 
In the latest version of NFPA 59A (2013 edition), an alternative method using a performance 
(risk assessment) based approach is included for LNG facility siting and layout analysis. This 
method requires LNG plants be designed and located in such areas as to not pose intolerable 
risks to the surrounding populations, installations, or property. The calculated individual risk 
(expressed in number of realizations per year) and societal risk (F-N curve) shall fall below the 
risk acceptability criteria. 
This method itself seems fairly reasonable with regard to the events to be included, hazard and 
consequence assessment modeling, and the risk tolerability criteria. However, the suggested 
component annual failure frequencies to be used in risk assessment are too optimistic and 
approximately two orders of magnitudes lower than the failure frequency data recognized by the 
industry [17, 14]. 
CSA Z276-2011 [18] 
The Canadian Standard CSA Z276 has historically aligned itself to and incorporated the NFPA 
59A revisions. CSA Z276-2011 requires the thermal safety distances be calculated as described 
in Section 5.2.3.2, and the dispersion safety distance be estimated using the guidance from 
Section 5.2.3.3. Those two sections from the CSA standard are very similar to the corresponding 
sections (Section 2.2.3.2 and 2.2.3.3) in NFPA 59A-2001. A newer version of this standard 
(CSA Z276-2015) is published by CSA recently, which is not reviewed and compared with the 
latest NFPA 59A (2013 edition) standard. 
33 CFR 165 (maritime-based Safety Zone) 
Unlike the DOT 49 CFR 193, the USCG 33 CFR 165 prescribes regulations for different types of 
zones of concern (i.e. Safety Zone and Security Zone during specified conditions) and regulated 
navigation areas. Note that this paper focuses on the Safety Zone since it is more relevant to 
accidental spills. According to Section 165.20 of 33 CFR, a Safety Zone is a water area, shore 
area, or water and shore area to which, for safety or environmental purposes, access is limited to 
authorized persons, vehicles, or vessels. It may be stationary and described by fixed limits or it 
may be described as a zone around a vessel in motion.  
Examples of fixed safety zones currently in place around liquefied gas carriers while they are 
moored pier side in U.S. ports include (49 CFR 193, Subpart F-Specific Regulated Navigation 
Areas and Limited Access Areas):  
• Distrigas LNG Facility, Everett, MA:  400-yard radius of any LNGC vessel moored at the 
dock. 
• Bath Iron Works, Bath, Maine: 150-yard radius of the Bath Iron Works dry dock on the 
Kennebec River. 
• Chesapeake Bay, MD:  500 yards in all directions from the Cove Point LNG terminal 
structure 
• Savannah River, Savannah, GA: 200-foot radius around Garden City Terminal. 
• Portsmouth Harbor, NH:  500-yard radius of any Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) vessel 
while it is moored at the LPG receiving facility on the Piscataqua River. 
No obvious consistency can be concluded by looking at the size (safety distance) of each Safety 
Zone. The sizes of Safety Zones are sometimes limited by the water dimensions. For example, a 
narrow waterway usually has a smaller zone otherwise the waterway will be no longer navigable. 
WSA NVIC 01-2011 and SANDIA 
Guidance on conducting a Waterway Suitability Assessment (WSA) published by USCG 
suggests using the “Zones of Concern” from Sandia National Laboratory’s study (SAND2004-
6258 and SAND2008-3253) or other zone sizes acceptable to the Vessel and Facility Operating 
Standards Division (CG-OES-2) to determine the main areas of concern along the waterway [7, 8, 
9].  
The Guidance on Risk Management for LNG Operations over Water documented in the Sandia 
Study (Sandia Report SAND2004-6258) provides the Zones of Concern analysis, which is 
accepted by the USCG for defining the safety zones [8]. The following definitions are taken from 
Sandia, which are based on detailed fire and dispersion analyses for a variety of realistic 
accidental and terrorism events; the following zones of concern correspond to the accidental 
events [8]: 
Zone 1 - These are areas in which LNG shipments transit narrow harbors or channels, pass under 
major bridges or over tunnels, or come within approximately 250 meters of people and major 
infrastructure elements, such as military facilities, population and commercial centers, or 
national icons. Within this zone, the risk and consequences of an accidental LNG spill could be 
significant and have severe negative impacts. Thermal radiation poses a severe public safety and 
property hazard, and can damage or significantly disrupt critical infrastructure located in this 
area. 
Zone 2 - These are areas in which LNG shipments and deliveries occur in broader channels or 
large outer harbors, or within approximately 250 m – 750 m of major critical infrastructure 
elements like population or commercial centers. Thermal radiation transitions to less severe 
hazard levels to public safety and property. Within Zone 2, the consequences of an accidental 
LNG spill are reduced and risk reduction and mitigation approaches and strategies can be less 
extensive.  
Zone 3 - This zone covers LNG shipments and deliveries that occur more than approximately 
750 m from major infrastructures, population/commercial centers, or in large bays or open water, 
where the risks and consequences to people and property of an accidental LNG spill over water 
are minimal. Thermal radiation poses minimal risks to public safety and property. 
World Association for Waterborne Transport Infrastructure (PIANC) [19] 
The World Association for Waterborne Transport Infrastructure (PIANC) advises on required 
spaces for safe berthing, which includes clearance between vessels moored at adjacent berth(s) or 
manoeuvring berths, distance between navigational channel and moored vessels, and safety zone 
around manifolds of berths and tankers. 
It recommends that a safety zone centered on the tanker’s manifold should be determined from 
the risk assessment to enable the tanker to berth and unberth without the safety zone on an 
adjacent vessel being breached. Factors to be considered would include:  
• Cargo type – flammability, density and toxicity of product and gases (Chemical, LNG or 
LPG) 
• Event scenario – loss of containment, such as cargo transfer hose or mechanical arm 
failure, vent release, penetration of outer hull and breach of inner hull structure, or failure 
of tanker or jetty equipment 
• Product spillage dispersion modelling including whether air or waterborne and whether 
gas density is heavier or lighter than air 
• Installed safety systems that can mitigate the effects of an event including; ESD 
(emergency shutdown), ERS (emergency release system), vapor detection, etc. 
• Prevailing environmental conditions – relative wind speed and direction, current and 
waves, etc. 
• Spacing to avoid escalation of potential incident at a berth to other berths, facilities or 
vessels 
Typical ranges for safety zones are 30 m from ship’s offshore side, as used in Japan for gas 
terminals (small release) and can extend to 200 - 300 m from the manifold for some LNG and 
LPG terminals. 
4 Compared Approaches for Determining Safety Zone on the Waterway 
The establishment of a safety zone and limiting public access to areas on the waterway is to limit 
the potential for collision from errant vessels, reduce the frequency of ignition by excluding 
uncontrolled and controlled ignition sources (passing vessels) from the zone for a certain time for 
safety or environmental purposes. It also aids in emergency preparation and provides necessary 
warning as the third parties’ vessel approaching the safety zones, which will prevent the public 
from being exposed to the potential harm. 
The following two types of approaches to determine the safety zones are compared in this paper: 
• Deterministic approach: the safety zone is determined by a consequence analysis 
methodology, where a set of representative scenarios are selected and the worst thermal 
radiation and flammable vapor dispersion hazard zones are predicted; this approach may 
produce very large or very small hazardous distances depending on selection of the 
representative scenario(s).  
• Probabilistic approach: the safety zone is calculated by using a risk based approach; this 
approach associates the consequence impacts (the thermal radiation intensities and the 
flammable vapor dispersion distances) with the frequency of having such hazards. A 
probabilistic approach may yield shorter distances than in a deterministic approach. 
Deterministic Approach 
Using this approach, the safety zone is conservatively determined based on the thermal and 
flammable dispersion consequence from the representative LNG spill scenarios.  
The selection of these scenarios is based on the initial hazard identification, which focuses on 
hazards that can result in a loss of containment at the terminal during the loading of the LNG 
cargos. It reflects the general project specific factors which include, but are not limited to: 
• LNG transfer rates and inventory inside the LNG cargo, 
• Transfer (loading) status (e.g. loading start-up with empty cargo tank, towards the end of 
loading with high filling percentage of the cargo tank, and loading finished ready to leave), 
• Implemented safeguards, 
• Properties of the LNG inside the tank (inventory, pressure, temperature, LNG filling level), 
• Vicinity to other targets of interest (onshore facility, water way, and etc.), 
• Location specific and representative weather conditions. 
The selected maximum credible scenario is determined on a conservative, but realistic basis 
considering the operation and the implemented safeguards. Typical scenarios might be LNG 
cargo tank release due to vessel collision or grounding at the terminal, loading arm disconnection 
resulted from ranging failure, or LNG loading pipe rupture from trestle structure failure. The 
maximum effect of the thermal radiation and the flammable gas dispersion hazards is modelled 
using DNV GL’s Phast software [20]. Phast is approved for use in LNG siting studies in the 
PHMSA validation exercise for dispersion models. 
Probabilistic Approach 
A risk-based approach considers both the severity and the likelihood of all identified release 
events. It begins with modeling the consequence (thermal radiation and the gas dispersion) of 
each credible scenario and then combines it with the frequency of having such hazards. Using 
this method, the Safety Zone is presented as an area exposed to a thermal radiation level or a 
flammable gas concentration (consequence end-points) with a predefined frequency level or 
higher (frequency threshold). Details can be found in Section  6 – Case Study. 
This requires a probabilistic assessment of all release scenarios from the waterfront configuration, 
including (if applicable): 
• Jetty side LNG loading/unloading pipe  
• Jetty side LNG circulation pipe – this circulates in the main lines to keep them cold 
• LNG transfer arm(s)/hose(s) 
• Jetty Manifolds 
• Jetty side LNG vapor return pipe and arm 
• LNG Carrier cargo tank. 
The probabilistic based approach provides a more realistic basis for making informed decisions 
as it considers the full range of events than an approach based on single, large event scenarios 
(which must incorporate expert judgement, that may or may not be accepted by all) as in the 
deterministic approach. It reflects the same general project specific factors as applied in the 
deterministic approach. In addition, the probabilistic approach takes explicit consideration of the 
likelihood of the full range of credible events; the assessment is thus based on both the 
consequence estimates and the probability for quantity of release, location of release, and 
probability of ignition as a function of time after the release, and environment factors such as the 
local wind rose distribution.  
5 Case Study – Safety Zone Determination at a LNG Export Terminal 
A demo case is used to compare the Safety Zones determined for a LNG export terminal via the 
two different approaches. The key assumptions, scenario summary, end-point criteria, and safety 
distance calculation are detailed in the following sub-sections. 
5.1 Key Assumptions 
The study boundary is represented by the waterfront configuration up to the first onshore ESD 
(at the shore side end of the access trestle), which includes the LNG carrier, loading arms/vapor 
return arm, trestle piping, and the onshore and jetty ESDVs. Key assumptions regarding the 
terminal facility and operation, meteorology data, ignition sources, leak frequency, representative 
hole sizes, and release locations are detailed in the table below.   
Table 1   Key Assumptions 
 Description Assumption Details 
Facility 
Operation 
Major equipment on the jetty 
loading platform (12 m above 
sea level) 
• two (2) loading arms (16 inch) 
• one (1) vapor return arm 
• Emergency Shutdown Valves (ESDVs) 
• vessel monitoring system 
• gangway tower 
• product delivery and vapor return pipe 
racks 
Access trestle (180 m) - 
provides structural support 
from shore to the loading 
platform 
• LNG product and circulation piping  
• vapor return piping  
• auxiliary mechanical and electrical 
systems, 
• access roadway 
Vessel calls 
140 LNG carriers per year 
Total vessel port time: 29 hours, including 2 
hours preparation for departure and 3 hours 
at turning basin 
Representative LNG carrier Capacity: 170,000 m
3, draft: 12 m, # of 
tanks: 4 
Loading operation 
Maximum loading rate: 10,000 m3 per hour 
Duration of each transfer: 12 to 18 hours, 
including approximately 2 hours for ramp up 
to and down from the normal loading rate 




Atmospheric temperature 10 
ᵒC used as average ambient air 
temperature 
Relative humidity 70 % used as average humidity. 
Solar Flux Day - 350 W/m², Night - 0 W/m² 
Surface temperature Same as atmospheric temperature 




A range of hole sizes are 
modeled 
The full range of possible hole sizes (small, 
medium, large, very large, and rupture)  
Cargo tank 
release sizes 
Three representative release 
sizes are modeled 
250 mm diameter hole for a small release 
750 mm diameter hole for a medium release 
1,100 mm diameter hole for a large release 
Frequency 
Equipment (piping, flange and 
valve) leak frequency 
HCRD generic failure frequency data 
(Bolsover et al. [17]) 
Loading arm failure frequency ACDS data [21] 
 Description Assumption Details 
LNG cargo spill frequency 
An energy model used to estimate the 
conditional probability of tank breach with 
attendant LNG release 
Ignition 
probability 
Immediate ignition probability UKOOA immediate ignition probability  
Delayed ignition probability Site specific ignition sources are identified-0.001 
Detection & 
Isolation 
Time to isolate  Small: 5 minutes, Medium: 2 minutes, Large and above: 1 minutes 
Probability of isolation failure P_isolation failure = 10% assumed 
5.2 Scenario Summary 
Table 2 summarizes the scenarios considered for calculating the safety distance, which is used to 
determine the Safety Zones based on accidental scenarios. The deterministic (or consequence-
based) approach will only assess the maximum credible scenario caused by ship collision, which 
is the accidental spill with effective breach area of 1m2 from one cargo tank due to hull structure 
penetration. Using the probabilistic (or risk-based) approach, all the identified credible scenarios 
(as shown in Table 2) are included, taking into account both the likelihood and the consequences 
(thermal radiation as well as natural gas dispersion) of each event. 
Table 2   Terminal Waterfront Release Scenarios 




Origin Release Location 
Marine Terminal Release Scenarios (Trestle) 
Loading line from 
downstream of the onshore 
ESD to the jetty ESD 
Loading and 
holding Liquid  
Pipeline Over water 
Onshore  On land 
Jetty Contained within impoundment 
Vapor return line from 
downstream Jetty ESD to 
the  onshore ESD 
Loading Vapor 
Pipeline N/A 
Onshore  N/A 
Jetty N/A 
Circulation line from 
downstream of the onshore 
ESD to the Jetty ESD 
Loading and 
holding Liquid 
Pipeline Over water 
Onshore  On land 
Jetty Contained within impoundment 
Marine Terminal Release Scenarios (Loading Platform) 
LNG piping to loading arms  Loading Liquid Pipeline Contained within impoundment 
LNG loading arms release Loading Liquid Loading arm Over water 
Vapor to return arm  Loading Vapor Pipeline N/A 
Vapor arm release Loading Vapor Loading arm N/A 
Marine Terminal Release Scenarios (LNG Carrier) 
Ship collision on LNGC Loading Liquid Cargo tank Over water 
5.3 End-point Criteria 
A thermal radiation level of 5,000 W/m2 was adopted for generating the thermal Safety Zone 
since it is typically considered as a maximum level of radiation heat flux for individuals to be 
exposed to and still be able to escape. The thermal Safety Zone can help to understand potential 
impacts to others. 
The LFL concentration level is selected for generating the gas dispersion Safety Zone, which can 
be used for limiting the public access in order to reduce the likelihood of a release reaching an 
ignition source. 
The impact frequency for evaluation is 1E-04 per year, equivalent to once every 10,000 years. 
This is a typical frequency threshold used broadly and accepted by the industry in Europe. This 
should be subject to any regulatory requirement or company internal guidance. 
5.4 Maritime Safety Zones from Accidental Releases  
Maritime Safety Zones for this example case determined by these two approaches are presented 
and compared below. Note that the maritime Safety Zones are the circular area (on the water side) 
with the radius equal to the safety distances and centered on the jetty area. 
Deterministic Approach – Consequence-based Method 
The maximum credible scenario identified at the terminal is the LNGC cargo tank breach due to 
ship collision with an equivalent hole diameter of 1,100 mm (1m2 spill area with one tank 
breached) [8]. This scenario predicts a maximum LFL dispersion distance of approximately 
1,600 m under the most unfavored wind condition. The downwind distance to the pool fire 
radiation level of 5,000 W/m2 is about 700 m.  
Table 3   Safety Distances (Safety Zone Radius) Determined by the Deterministic Approach 
Impact Criteria Safety Zone Radius (m) 
Maximum Credible 
Event 
Lower Flammable Limit 
(LFL) 1,600 
LNG spill from 1 m2 
spill area with one tank 
breached 5,000 W/m2 700 
 
 
Figure 1   Dispersion and Fire Safety Zones – Deterministic Approach 
 
Probabilistic Approach – Risk-based Method 
Using the probabilistic approach, all scenarios defined in Table 2 are modelled considering and 
the safety distance determined using the risk-based method is presented in the table below (Table 
4).  
Table 4   Safety Distances (Safety Zone Radius) Determined by the Probabilistic Approach 
Impact Criteria Safety Zone Radius Frequency 
(m) threshold 
Lower Flammable Limit 
(LFL) 
500 1E-04 per year 
5 kW/m2 230 1E-04 per year 
 
 
Figure 2   Dispersion and Fire Safety Zones – Probabilistic Approach 
6 Conclusions 
The consequence-based safety distances (used to generate the deterministic Safety Zones) are 
often greater than the risk-based safety distances, and are based on some assumption of 
maximum credible event. Therefore, the Safety Zones defined using the deterministic approach 
often covers more waterway area. This is the most conservative way of defining the Safety Zones 
with less details of the LNG facility needed; however, the estimated safety distance can be very 
large which is entirely based on one single large event without taking into account the likelihood 
of the event.  
Although more information and effort are required to produce the risk-based safety distance used 
for defining the Safety Zones, it provides a more realistic basis for making risk reduction 
recommendations and focuses on site specific data related to all aspects of the operation (i.e. 
LNG loading and circulation, vapor return, LNG transfer, LNGC approaching/preparing for 
leaving). The risk based approach is more realistic because it considers the full range of the 
possible events, and combining the possible consequences with the likelihoods.  
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